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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

AMERICAN GYPSUM TRUST, a
common law trust, and JOHN PAUL
JONES, S. LEWIS CRANDALL, JOHN
RUSSELL RITTER, et al,
Plaintiffs-Respondents,
-vs-

Case No.
12887

GEORGIA-PACIFIC CORPORATION,
Defendant-Appellant.

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT GEORGIAp ACIFIC CORPORATION

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
An analysis of the facts stated and arguments
made in Respondents' brief convinces us that, faced
vvith an adverse record in the Court below and the
rationale of the overwhelming array of legal authorities cited by Appellant, Georgia-Pacific Corporation,
(hereinafter referred to as G-P), Respondents have
adopted the diversionary principle of skipping around
the real issues. Rather than follow their lead we will
merely point out to this Court the errors in the facts
stated or not mentioned by them. In that connection,
1

we rest assured that the Court will examine the pertinent portions of the record itself in areas where the
parties are in dispute.
The position of G-P throughout this entire lawsuit and in this reply brief has been and is as follows:
1. The requirements provision of the lease
agreement does not impose upon G-P an obligation
to supply the requirements of any given fixed market area or produce gypsum products at the Sigurd '
plant at any set production level. G-P acted in a prudent and businesslike manner for all interests concerned in light of the existing economic conditions
by acquiring the Lovell, Wyoming plant, increasing
capacity at the Acme, Texas plant, and concentrating
the Sigurd market area.
2. Since becoming the assignee of the lease, G-P
has strictly complied with generally accepted accounting principles in calculating the profit royalty
by trans£erring gypsum products from the Sigurd
plant to the distribution center at the wholesale fair
market value.
3. The record does not contain any evidence
which supports the trial court's finding that there was
a fixed historical Sigurd market area.
4. As a matter of law, the testimony of the witness for Respondents, Grant Caldwell, was inadmissible for the reasons that:
2

(a) He made economic assumptions to support his contentions which he was not qualified to
make as an expert in the fields in which he expressed his opinion, and
( b) His assumptions and conclusions were
not supported by facts of record. On the contrary they
were based on his imagination and desires.
In the portion of Respondents' brief entitled Introduction to Argument the Respondents make certain specious statements. Firstly, they assert that there
is net a single argument on any principle of law involved in any of Georgia-Pacific's claims of error. Secondly, they contend that G-P had failed to cite the
overwhelming evidence that supports the trial court's
findings, and thirdly, that G-P is seeking a retrial of
isolated parts of this action.
To aid the Court in following our contentions,
and rejecting those of Respondents, we file under separate cover Appendix "A" to this brief. It contains
the evidence which will show to the Court that the
Respondents have either misstated the facts, overlooked those essential to properly resolve the issue,
unfairly characterized their effect, or imagined their
presence in the record.
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POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BOTH LEGALLY AND FACTUALLY IN ENTERING ITS
FINDING OF FACT NO. 27 WHICH DEALS
WITH THE REQUIREMENTS PROVISION
OF THE LEASE AND SADDLES GEORGIAPACIFIC WITH AN OBLIGATION TO PRODUCE AT A GIVEN LEVEL.
Point I of Respondents' brief indicates that the
arguments arc directed to answering G-P's contention
that the lease does not obligate it to supply gypsum
products from the Sigurd plant to a fixed market area
or that it must produce at any given level. However,
most of the argument directs itself to Point III of G-P's
brief which deals with the erroneous economic assumptions upon which the trial court based its find.ings and conclusions as to damages. That issue will
be developed in a subsequent portion of this brief.
Preliminary to our principal development we
mention that Respondents assert that G-P's position
here and below is that the requirements language of
the lease agreement means nothing - that it is not
even a part of the lease. Nothing could be further
from the truth. An examination of the argument under this point in G-P's opening brief will demonstrate
beyond cavil that our position on the issue was that
the requirements language of the lease agreement
>vas indeed a vital part of the bargain negotiated by
the parties and that the requirements language pen4

1

ned by Judge Ritter when he wrote the lease is clear
and unambiguous and binds both parties.
A cursory reading of the document establishes
that Judge Ritter selected the following words to evidence the understanding of the parties as to requirements:
" ... all gypsum requirements of the lessee
or his assigns shall be supplied from the demised premises hereinabove described, providing
rock of the kind and quality needed can be supplied therefrom ... "
In applying this language to the parties at the time
of the execution of the lease, the following facts adduced at trial are vital and with them the picture
painted by the words become clear:
1. The execution of the lease agreement in 1946
was preceded by long and hard negotiations in which
the lessor was represented by Judge Ritter, and the
lease itself vvas written by Judge Ritter. (Ab 178, 179,
191, 194) 1
2. The assets of the lessor at the time and the
Reference numbers designated herein refer to the following
parts of the record:
(Ab ......... ) designated references to the abstract of the
Transcript of the trial court proceedings.
(C. ________ )
the Record on Appeal as submitted by the district court.
(Ex .. _____ ) designates the exhibits admitted as evidence
at trial.
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subject of the lease were a group of gypsum claims
among numerous other similar claims in
the same general area. (Ab. 179, 214-215, 238)
3. To encourage mining of the claims by lessee
and to prevent lessee from using better quality ore
in place of that of lessors, the parties specifically
agreed that lessee would construct a plant and that
the gypsum requirements of that plant would be taken from lessor's claims, not from other sources. Significantly, it is pertinent to note that both United
States Gypsum Company, with a plant next door, and
G-P itself, have extensive ore bodies contiguous to
those embraced by this lease agreement. (Ab. 179,
794, 805, 214-215, 238)
4. Intent is often shown by silence and the lease
language selected by Judge Ritter referred neither
to any required level of production of the plant to be
constructed or to-any exclusive market area to be served by the plant.
5. In more than twenty (20) years of lease operation, no claim was ever made by lessor that the
requirements language imposed either production level requirements or market area requirements. (Ab.
524-526)
6. Lessor did not assert such claim in the negotiations that led to the filing of this litigation or even
in its complaint when originally filed. (Ab. 199, 202203, Ex. 163)
6

7. Over many years of performance pursuant
to the lease agreement, G-P and its predecessors in
interest have scrupulously adhered to the require:..
ments language of the lease by providing all of the
requirements of this plant from lessor's ore body, despite the fact that, over the years, the quality of the
ore has presented serious problems. Moreover, richer
ore deposits contiguous to the claims in the lease were
available and owned by G-P and its predecessors. (Ab.
817-821, 832-833, 214) Had G-P not been obligated under the requirements provision of the lease
to obtain gypsum ore only from Respondents' premises, G-P would have utilized the higher quality ore
contiguous thereto to its economic advantage.
With support from these uncontroverted facts,
the position of G-P is that the trial court erred as a
matter of law in its findings of fact and conclusions
of law by:
1. Writing burdensome obligations into the contract of the parties not placed there by Judge Ritter
when he wrote the lease in 1946.
2. Writing implied contract obligations not
within a reasonable construction of the agreement
favoring the scrivener of the lease.
3. Writing new obligations in the lease at a time
some twenty (20) years subsequent to the date of the
lease. These obligations consist of creating a production level requirement and geographic market area
requirement based upon varying circumstances which
developed over the intervening years.
7

4. Adding obligations to an assignee of the lessee not saddled on the original lessee.
5. In failing to bar Respondents from belatedly
asserting their unnegotiated requirements theory after G-P, relying upon the agreement itself and prior
interpretive actions of Respondents, acquired the Sigurd operations.
The argument made by Respondents as to the
actions by G-P and the market and competitive conditions which arose twenty (20) years after the lease
agreement was negotiated is totally irrelevant to proper interpretation of the requirements provision of the
lease. The issue here being discussed is the intention
of the parties at the time the lease was negoitated and
their construction of its terms over many years. At
the time of execution there was a single lessee, a single lessor, a single ore deposit owned by lessors and
an obligation to construct a single plant. The ore body
was adjacent to numerous other ore bodies. The parties, in language enunciated by Judge Ritter, the lessor's attorney, stated clearly and simply that lessee
will supply the single plant to be constructed from
Respondents' ore body, not from contiguous ore boddies. That is the only requirement provision contained
in the agreement. It has been performed by G-P and
Respondents should not be permitted to alter its terms
by arguments relating to changed conditions and
competitive factors arising during the twenty (20)
years G-P and its predecessors have mined the property. Such argument is clearly deceptive. Further8

!
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more, as is demo11stratecl by Appendix "A", at pages
19-i-1, the chanictcrizntion of the evidence of record
11 1 this section of R('sponclents' brief is not accurat·2.
Respondents' only chnllengc to the fil'e separately stated legal aq..,ruments set forth in G-P's opening
brief, cleoling with the interpretation of requirements
contracts, is to its orgument on estoppcl. And, even
in that Cl ttock, the primary thrust of their argument
is procedural in 1rnturc rather than substantive. Respornll-11 ts nrnintain that the estoppel argument was
neyer raised below and, therefore, as a matter of law,
cannot be raised on this appeal. This assertion is plainly· false. Attached hereto as Appendix "Il" is an excerpt from memorandum filed ·with the trial court
in support of G-P's Motion for Summary Judgment.
(C. 382-385) It is proper to raise estoppcl by motion
for summary judgment. (Sec Moore's Federal Practice, 2cl Ed. Yol. 2A § §8.28, 12.09, construing Rule
12 ( b J ( 6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
which is identical to the Utah Rule as here pertinent.)
The m<itter was again presented to the court below in
G-P's post trial brief. CC. 657)
As to the issue of estoppel, Respondents further
contend at page 15 of their brief that estoppel cannot
be found because of the lease provision relating to
nun-waiver of prior breaches. This position likewise
is" ithout merit.
,\s stated by Professo1· Corbin:
'·Parties to a contract cannot, even by an
express prov1s10n 111 that contract, deprive
9

themselves of the power to alter or vary or discharge it by subsequent agreement. * * * In
like manner, a provision that an express condition of a promise or promises in the contract
cannot be eliminated by waiver, or by conduct
constituting an estoppel, is wholly ineffective.
The promissor still has the power to waive the
condition, or by his conduct to estop himself
from insisting upon it, to the same extent that
he would have had this p0:wer if there had been
no such provision." Corbin on Contracts, 1951
Ed. §763, Vol. 3A p. 351.
In summary, the contract language is clear. Even
if we go so far as to assume ambiguity the language
must be construed against the scrivener. G-P conformed with the requirements language of the agreement. Respondents are est0:pped from asserting their
requirements theory, after permitting G-P to acquire
the lease without first advising of such unstated claim
which was impossible of determination either by examination of the lease itself or of the conduct of the
parties in their performance over those many years.
POINT II
RESPONDENTS PREMISE ARGUMENTS
ALLEGING A DEFINED HISTORIC SIGURD MARKET AREA UPON "FACTS"
WHICH ARE NOT TO BE FOUND IN THIS
RECORD.
Respondents, in support of the Court's ruling on
market area and to uphold the argument in their
brief, make two basic and erroneous assertions. They
are:
10

1. That from the date of the execution of the
lease agreement to the date of trial, a fixed and historic market area had been served exclusively by the
Sigurd plant.
2. That G-P creamed the market to its own advantage and acted in a manner adverse to the interest
of the parties to the lease.
As to the first assertion, the uncontroverted evidence which is set forth in Appendix "A" (pages
2-12) is to the contrary. In summary, there never
·was and never has been any fixed or certain market area served by the Sigurd plant. Any market area
mentioned has fluctuated depending upon existing
market conditions and competitive forces. No part
of the critical Southern California market was served by Sigurd from 1952 through 1958. That market
was served by the lessee from the Union Gypsum
plant in Phoenix, Arizona. (Ab. 103, 119, 121-123,
569-570, Ex. 110)
The second assertion is as vulnerable as the first
for it too lacks evidentiary support and in fact, is contrary to the facts. Respondents offered no evidence
on this subject at all, except the erroneous assumptions or conclusions of its unqualified expert. Respondents' accounting witness admittedly had no knowledge oi background of any kind with respect to the
subject being considered. (Ab. 364-365) The only
admissible and trustworthy evidence offered by any
party at the trial came through the knowledgeable
administrative and executive employees of G-P (Mc11

Caskill, Burch and Wilson) and through independent
economic and marketing experts (Grether and Rosse).
Their testimony demonstrates that the very acts 2 of
G-P vvhich are complained of by Respondents were
beneficial, not detrimental to the Sigurd operation
and to Respondents' interests. (Ab. 437-438, 468-470,
541-542, 595, 628-631, 643-644, 688). (Sec Appendix
"A", pages 32-+1) But for these acts, this plant
would have suffered the same fate as its more favorably situated competitors-it would have been forced
to close down. CAb. 464, 594) This evidence is
uncontroverted. Respondents' bold declaration to the
contrary cannot change the record.
Respondents do not here point to any language
in the lease agreement or to any evidence in a "1946"
time frame which would indicate an intention to bind
the lessee to serve exclusively any particular market
area. The entire market area argument, therefore,
is wholly irrelevant. In addition, as is noted above,
the basic factual premises utilized as a base is false.
2.

The acquisition of the Lovell, Wyoming plant to prohibit
a competitor from acquiring it and competing with Sigurd
in the intermountain area (Ab. 4·66); the addition of production capacity at the Acme, Texas plant to relieve the
burden on Sigurd of shipping to Southern California at a
loss. (Ab. 526-527) The concentration of the Sigurd market 0rea to reduce costs (Ab. 594); and the use of G-P's
existing distribution centers to take advantage of truck delivery and multi-product sales. (Ab. 364)

12

POINT III
THE "ASSUMPTIONS" OR "CONCLUSIONS" TESTIFIED TO BY RESPONDENTS' ACCOUNTING WITNESS, CALDWELL, ARE INADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE AND ARE NOT SUPPORTED BY
EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD.
As we read Respondents' arguments under Point
III, they do not quarrel with the legal propositions
stated in G-P's opening brief that Mr. Caldwell was
not competent to state the assumptions and conclusions3 relied upon by him at the trial. Rather, they
seek to escape those propositions by suggesting that the
trial judge's findings are supported by other evidence.
In this regard, we invite the attention of the Court to
the argument contained under Point III in G-P's
opening brief which demonstrated the total inadmis3 These assumptions are:
1. The price decline in the Western market was caused solely by G-P in its operation of the Lovell and
Acme plants. (Ab. 309-314)
2. The Sigurd plant should have experienced profit
levels in 1965-1970 equal to the profit levels of 19621964. (Ex. 139-141)
3. The production of G-P's Acme and Lovell plants
supplied to the West Coast could have been supplied,
to the extent of Sigurd's capacity, at a profit level
as in the years 1962, 1963 and 1964. (Exs. 139-141)
4. During the years 1967-1968 the Sigurd plant could
have produced at 973 of the capacity which was the
capacity achieved by that plant in 1967 and at the
same profit level as was reached in the years 1962,
1963 and 1964. (Ex. 139-141)

13

sibility and incompetence of the testimony of Grant
Caldwell.
The Respondents chide G-P for asserting that
Caldvvell made economic "assumptions", but they
then go on to admit that he testified as follows:
" ... additional capacity from Lovell, Acme,
and the other Georgia-Pacific sources so affected the price of gypsum products in the Sigurd
market tlzat tlze price experienced in that market in the period 1968-70 was an unreliable index for measuring plaintiff's damages." (see
page 21)
Respondents further proceed to make this admission:
"Mr. Caldwell and the trial court logically

concluded that the profits at the Sigurd plant
would not have changed absent Georgia-Pacific
violations of the lease, except ns the price of
gypsum products declined in areas untainted
b_Y Georgia-Pacific's misconduct." (see p. 2122)

Mr. Caldwell's assumptions or conclusions are
without foundation and should not have been received
in evidence. Over objections of G-P they were improperly admitted, relied upon, and used as a basis for the
findings of the Court below as to damages and future
accounting procedures. 1\1r. Caldwell admitted that he
had not made any study to support his conclusions as
a market analyst or economist; that he is neither a
market analyst nor a professional economist; that he
had made no studies as to vvlrnt competitors were doing in the market place; and, that he did not know
14

what customers were doing or demanding in the market place. (Ab. 364-365)
Furthermore, the only competent evidence in the
record on this subject did not support Caldwell's conclusions. This uncontroverted evidence is summarized
in Appendix "A" Cpp. 19-41) submitted herewith and
was furnished by the witnesses Wilson, McCaskill,
Burch, Grether and Rosse. In substance, the evidence
is that G-P acted in good faith and exercised prudent
business judgment and its acts inured to the benefit
and not detriment, of the Sigurd plant and of Respondents' interests. Accordingly, Respondents' conclusions as to tainted acts and misconduct on the part
of G-P and alleged adverse effects thereof upon
Respondents reflect only visionary hopes and aspirations of counsel.
Respondents attempt to rehabilitate themselves in
their brief by boldly asserting:

"* * * the Trial Court did not rely solely upon
Mr. Caldwell's testimony, but relied heavily
upon the testimony of Georgia-Pacific's own
witnesses." (pp. 20-21)
As noted previously and verified by the evidence listed in Appendix "A", this proposition is not true. The
testimony of G-P's executive employees, and of the
independent qualified experts is to the contrary. The
thrust of Respondents' argument here is simply to
escape the effects of the wholly uncontroverted evidence. 4
4.

In G-P's opening brief, attention is invited to Mr. Caldwell's admitted lack of knowledge of basic economic prin-

15

The cases cited on page 23 of Respondents' brief
to the effect that a wrongdoer must bear the risk of
uncertainty in measuring the harm he causes are not
here pertinent.
G-P maintained financial recotrds in accordance
with established business practices in the industry
as required by the lease agreement. Furthermore,
Respondents, not G-P, have the burden to eliminate
whatever uncertainty there may be as to what causes
the alleged damages. This is Horn Book law:
ciples affecting the gypsum industry. G-P then argued that
the assumption of Mr. Caldwell that Georgia-Pacific was
entirely to blame for the precipitous price decline of gypsum products in the Wes tern Market area beginning in
1968 was unsupported by any foundation whatsoever. Respondents have dedicated a major portion of their brief,
pp. 7, 10, 12, 13, 20, 21, 23, to discredit this argument. They
have attempted to do so by pointing to a lag between the
time at which increased supply and decreased housing
starts commenced (1966-1967) and the time at which the
price decline occµrred. (1968) Their argument simply is not
supported by evidence of record. The uncontroverted evidence of record and case law demonstrate the cause of this
time lag. In 1966 to 1967, the price was not determined
by the law of supply and demand. It was artificially supported by actions of Georgia-Pacific's leading competitors
in the West, namely U. S. Gypsum, National Gypsum and
Kaiser Gypsum. Dr. Rosse so testified. The Federal Court
so found in Wall Products Co. v. National Gypsum Co., 326
F. Supp. 295 (N.D. Calif. 1971) which is a part of the record in this case. (see especially C. 724-725) . The tes timony of Dr. Rosse on this subject and the excerpt from
Wall Products are set out for the convenience of the Court
on pages 24-27 of Appendix "A" accompanying this brief.

16

" ... no recovery can be had where resort
must be had to speculation or conjecture for
the purpose of determining whether the damages resulted from the act of which complaint
is made or from some other cause, or where it
is impossible to say what, if any, portion of the
damages resulted from the fault of the defendant and what portion from the fault of the
plaintiff himself." (Emphasis is the Court's)
Allen v. McCormick 238 P.2d 220 at 224 citing
15 Am Jur Damages, 413 §22.
This Court has accepted this principle of law, see
Gould v. Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph Co.,
6 U.2d 187 at 193, 309 P.2d 802 (1957).
Mr. Caldwell's assumptions, the only testimony
proffered by Respondents as to the cause of damages,
and which were accepted by trial court, are mere
speculations and conjectures which have been completely refuted by all admissible evidence of record.
The record demonstrates that by a single unfounded
Caldwell assumption accepted at the trial level, the
Judge found that G-P was the sole cause of the 1968
product price decline in the Western Market area.
Based on that erroneous assumption, he increased the
damages assessed against G-P by $233,416. CSee Appendix "B" to G-P's opening brief) vVe repeat that
all admissible evidence as to this issue was contrary
to this assumption. Even as to the measure of damages this court has consistently held that although
they need not be measured with exactness, such
measure must have a reasonable basis. (See Robinson
v. Hreinson, 17 U.2d 261, 267, 408 P.2d 121 C1965).
Monter v. Kratzers Specialty Bread Company, ........... .
17

U.2d ------------,Docket No. 12810 (December 5, 1972).
Only when plaintiffs show such basis by admissible
evidence must G-P bear a burden for any alleged iisk
of uncertainty. Respondents have not met this burden.

POINT IV
THE ASSERTIONS MADE BY RESPONDENTS IN THEIR POINT IV THAT THE
SOLE ACTIVITY IN G-P'S DISTRIBUTION
SYSTEM IS A SELLING FUNCTION AND
SHOULD NOT BE USED AS AN EXPENSE
IN DETERMINING THE PROFIT ROYALTY IS CONTRARY TO THE UNCONTRO·
VERTED TESTIMONY OF ALL EXPERT
WITNESSES.
Respondents attack G-P's method of accounting
by asserting the letter agreement between Bestwall
Gypsum and Respondents containing the 10% formula (Ex. 113) applies to costs other than those attributable to the expenses of general administration,
selling and advertising. This Respondents do by including in the formula costs of warehousing functions in the distribution centers which prior to the
G-P - Bestwall merger, lessees did not perform, but
were borne by independent dealers. Respondents are
ignoring that the letter agreement specifically limits
the formula to selling, advertising and general administrative expenses.
18

G-P's integration of the gypsum division into
its distribution system and elimination of the independent dealer allowed G-P to substitute warehousing and related services for the Sigurd plant at a
lesser cost and improved benefits to the customer than
was possible prior thereto. This evidenced by the following:
1. Competitive factors and marketing patterns
in the California market, which commenced to m::tterialize immediately after G-P acquired the Sigurd
plant, caused numerous competitors of G-P many
hundreds of miles nearer the principle market to close
plants and required G-P to adopt an innovative distribution system to avoid closure of Sigurd. (Ab. 440441, 464, 594).
2. The technique utilized by G-P, which resulted in continued operations at Sigurd, was the integration of gypsum products into the existing warehouse
distribution system of G-P. (Ab. 463-464)
3. Prior to G-P's integration of the gypsum division into the distribution system, all handling, sales,
warehousing, transportation and servicing functions
beyond the rail head were provided by independent
dealers. (Ab. 537, 436, 600, 447) To cover costs and
provide a profit to the dealers, a fee was charged
which was represented by the difference between the
wholesale price paid Sigurd and retail price charged
the customers. (Ab. 447) Had G-P allowed Sigurd
to continue to sell to the dealers at a price which
would have allowed the dealers to realize a return
19

on their investment, it would have been forced to
close the Sigurd plant. CAb. 464, 594)
4. The distribution system was adopted by G-P
m good faith and considered necessary to save the
operation. (Ab. 536-539, 463-64, 594). The economic
marketing experts, Rosse and Grether, testified the
change was commendable and represented the exercise of sound business judgment. (Ab. 643-44, 678)
The net effect of this distribution system was to have
G-P provide the wholesaling function theretofore supplied by independent dealers at a substantially lower cost to the Sigurd plant than would have been the
case had independent dealers continued to perform
that function. CAb. 608-09)
5. The warehouse function at the G-P distribution centers includes unloading of rail cars, inventorying, placing in storage, extracting from storage,
delivery to the end user and accessorial services at
the job site such as breaking packages, segregating,
and delivering sheet by sheet to a designated floor
of a building under construction. CAb. 835-38) Prior
to the integration of gypsum into the G-P distribution centers, all of these warehousing functions were
supplied by independent dealers. The total cost
thereof consequently was borne by Sigurd in the form
of a reduction in sale price. CAb. 558-59, 456-57, 541,
167, Ex. 152)
Respondents' arguments characterizing all warehousing functions as selling expenses are untenable.
The only evidence offered on this subject by Respond20

....

ents was furnished by Caldwell. Although he indulged in an assumption, without foundation, that all of
these warehouse related functions were "selling"
costs, an admission was wrested from him on crossex0mination that there are significant "costs of handling materials" in the warehouses that are not "selling" functions. (Ab. 368-69, 93 7-38) He further admi ttcd he had given no consideration to these warehousing costs under his method of accounting. Caldwell simply had assumed that these warehousing
costs were selling costs.
G-P's expert accounting witness, Duncan, testified that it is:
"Improper to include the profits earned by
Pryor on the sale of paper to Sigurd and improper to include the sales by the distribution
centers relating the to Sigurd product." CAb.

715)

Duncan further testified under sound accounting
principles and principles accepted by the Internal
Revenue Service, as specifically required by the lease
agreement, G-P warehousing costs must be handled
in one of two ways:
1. By treating the warehousing or wholesaling
fnnction as it had been treated historically as an independent function. Hence, the sale price to Sigurd
would be the wholesale market price and none of the
expenses of the vrnrehousing and wholesale function
\Youlcl be charged against the Sigurd plant. This was
the method adopted by G-P, and, of the two permis21

sible methods, was to the benefit of Respondents. (Ab.
716-23, see Ex. 152) 5
2. If the price of the product to the end customer (retail price) is utilized in Sigurd accounting,
then the necessary costs of the performance of the
warehousing and wholesaling function must be deducted therefrom. (Ab. 723-24) Since G-P warehouses
are operated at a loss as to gypsum products CAb. 74445) and since these warehousing and wholesaling
functions are supplied by G-P much more cheaply
than the same could be obtained through third party
contracts (Ab. 608-09), the accepting of this accounting method would be less advantageous to Respondents than is the system utilized by G-P.
Respondents here assert and the court below erroneously found that the Sigurd plant should be
credited with the retail price to the end user, but that
none of the wholesaling, warehousing, transportation
or accessorial product and customer service functions
were to be charged against the retail price. By accepting this view, the court below: (a) departed from
sound accounting principles, Cb) departed from general accounting principles as applied by the Internal
Revenue Service, ( c) igno:red the historic treatment
of this subject by the parties through their perform5

Significantly, the trial court accepted this testimony as it
related to the prrper purchases from the Pryor plant but rejected it as applied to the distribution center concept. (Findings of Fact 21, 28, C. 485-86, 491, Conclusion of Law 4,
C. 494, 493) We respectfully submit that such rejection was
erroneous.
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ance under the lease, and Cd) materially altered the
lease provisions to the very significant advantage of
the lessor and disadvantage of the lessee. In so doing,
the court below erred and the findings should be set
aside, the judgment reversed and one entered in favor G-P on its counterclaim against Resp0tndents in the
sum of $41,879.00.
POINT V
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING TO AWARD PLAINTIFFS THEIR
COSTS AND ATTORNEYS' FEES IN THIS
ACTION.
Respondents' argument under their Point V directs itself to the refusal of the trial court to award
to them attorneys' fees and costs. The controlling
lease provision states:
"Fourteenth: It is mutually covenanted and
agreed that costs and reasonable attorneys' fees

incurred in enforcing the terms and provisions
of this lease shall be borne by the party who

breaches the covenants, agreements, terms and
provisions thereof.:' (Emphasis added)

As noted above, there were only two pre-litigation disputes between the parties. Both involved proper accounting procedures to be used in computing
lease royalty. The first involved the purchase of paper from G-P's plant at Pryor, Oklahoma. On that
issue, the trial court found that G-P's accounting procedures were proper, that Respondents' claims were
23

contrary to the lease prnvisions. ( C. 491, 49:3) Re.
spondents' judgment \Yi1.S offoet i1.ccorchngly in the
judgment below pursmmt to G-P's counterclaim.
Hence, as to this issue, attorney's fees and costs \Yere
expended by G-P to enforce the "terms and provisions" of the lease against erroneous claims by Respondents. Since no ap])('ol was pedcctecl by Respondents as to this issue, the nrntter is final. The second '
pre-litigation issue invohccl distribution center accounting. 011 thu.t issw•, the trial conrt found that
G-P's accounting procedures \YC're inconsistent \Yith ,
the lease provi'.;ions u.rnl enicre(l judgment for Respondents. Assurni1lp;,
the validity of tlw
finding mid judgment on the SC'cornl pre-litigation i:isue, here on appeal, then both prn·ties expended smns
for attorney's fees and costs to enforce the "terms and
provisions" of the lC'ase.
!

Hence, the court below ruled that the claims and
actions of both parties violated "covenants, agreements, terms and provisions" of the lease agreement.
Instead of awarding attorney's fees and costs to both,
the trial court disallovvecl them to each. In so acting,
it certainly did not abuse its discretion.
The picture is similar as to the two new issues
generated by the complaint and refined in the course
of litigation which were 1lever the subject of pre-litigation claims. One of these issues involved claims of
violation of the requirements provision. The other
claimed conduct in lease' performance by G-P violative of both lease prov1s10ns allcl of state anti-trust
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laws. Again, the court below split its holding on the
issues, siding with G-P on one and for Respondents
on the other. Again, Respondents have not appealed
from the ruling adverse as to them and that matter
is final.
The cases cited by Respondents are inapposite.
The rationale of these cases is that where only one
of the parties breaches an agreement which provides
for attorney's fees for the victor, the winning party
may recover the same. Such is not the case here because the lease language is different and neither
party was the victor.
From the foregoing it is apparent that the Trial
Judge iuled correctly on this issue.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, Georgia-Pacific asserts that it has
demonstrated as a matter of law and fact that it has
complied in all respects with the requirements and
all other provisions of the lease; that it has acted in
accordance with the generally accepted accounting
principles in calculating royalties as required by the
agreement; that the record proves positively that
there was not a fixed historical Sigurd market area;
that the testimony of Caldwell was inadmissible as
the economic assumptions he made to determine both
the cause and measw·e of damages were false; that
there are no facts furnished by other witnesses which
would support such assumptions and, therefore, the
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findings of fact, conclusions of law and the judgment
by the trial judge must fail.
For all of the foregoing reasons, Georgia-Pacific
requests that this Court reverse the Judgment in favor
of Respondent granted by the trial judge and enter
judgment favorable to Georgia-Pacific as prayed for
in its counterclaim, together with costs, expenses and
attorneys' fees.
Respectfully submitted,
GEORGE W. LATIMER
KEITH E. TAYLOR
ROYE. MOORE
of and for
PARSONS, BERLE & LATIMER
520 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorneys for DefendantAppellant Georgia-Pacific
Corporation
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APPENDIX "A"
This Appendix set forth under separate cover
for convenience of the Court.

1

APPENDIX "B"
EXCERPT FROM DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PARTIAL
SUMMARY JUDGMENT DISCUSSING ITS
ARGUMENT OF ESTOPPEL.
(C 382-385)
POINT IV
THE PLAINTIFFS ARE ESTOPPED FROM
ASSERTING THAT THE DEFENDANTS
MUST SUPPLY ALL OF THEIR REQUIREJ\1ENTS OF GYPSUM ORE FROM THE
LEASED PREMISES.
Prior to the assignment of the Lease Agreement :
to Defendant, Georgia-Pacific, there has been an as- '·
signment from \Vestern Gypsum Company to the
Bestwall Gypsum Company. At the time of the Western-Bestwall assignment the Plaintiffs gave their ex- '
press written consent. At that time Bestwall had several gypsum plants and ore bodies throughout the
country. (Affidavit of Glenn E. Wilson, Paragraph
6). From the date that the assignment from Western
to Bestwall was made until the Complaint was filed
no demands were made by the Plaintiffs upon Bestwall or Defendants to fulfill all of their requirements
of gypsum ore for their various plants throughout the
United States from the leased premises at Sigurd,
Utah. (Affidavit of Glenn E. Wilson, Paragraph 10).
In addition, at the time the merger between Bestwall and Georgia-Pacific took place an assignment
was effectuated, CC 382) vvhich made the lease agreement binding upon Georgia-Pacific. Thereafter, the
11

,

same silent condition existed and no demands were
made by the Plaintiffs to the Defendants that they
were legally bound to take their gypsum requirements for other plants from the leased premises at
Sigurd, Utah. (Affidavit of Glenn E. Wilson, Paragraph 10). With full knowledge that GeorgiaPacific and its predecessors had extensive operations
in far-away places, not the slightest intimation was
offered that it was breaching the provisions now
seized upon as the basis for Plaintiffs' present cause
of action. If they ever had any such an idea, they
certainly slept on their rights and successfully lulled
each assignee into believing that the terms of the
contract were being fully performed.
The business relationship between the Trustees
of American Gypsum Trust and the various lessees
gave the Trustees ample opportunity to bring to the
attention of Bestwall and Georgia-Pacific the Plaintiffs' interpretation of the "requirements" clause in
the lease. Had Plaintiffs prior to the last assignment
advanced their present theory, Georgia-Pacific would
not have merged with Bestwall and assumed the
obligations of the lease agreement. (Affidavit of
Glenn E. Wilson, Paragraph 13). This must necessarily follow, for if Georgia-Pacific were compelled
under the agreement to supply from the leased premises at Sigurd, Utah, all of the gypsum ore required
for all of the products it produces and sells throughout
the United States, the shipping costs of ore to the
various plants vvould be greater than the sale price
of the finished product.
(Affidavit of Glenn E.
iii

Wilson, Paragraph 11). Under these circumstances
the operational costs would be prohibitive and none
of the plants could operate at a profit. (Affidavit of
Glenn E. Wilson, Paragraph 12). Certainly the parties would not intend to execute a contract which
would bar ipso facto any chances for profit and render
the operation so expensive that any continuation of
CC 383) the business would result in bankruptcy.
The facts stated above provide every element required by law to estop the Plaintiffs from asserting
their claim that Georgia-Pacific must fulfill all of its
gypsum requirements from the leased premises. It
is well settled that one who is silent when good faith
requires him to speak cannot afterwards be heard to
say that it is not true which his conduct unmistakably
declared was true, and on the faith of which others
have acted. Kirk v. Hamilton, 102 U.S. 68, 26 L.Ed.
79 (1880).

1

The elements to be met in order to invoke the
principle of estoppel caused by the inaction or silence
of the estopped party are set forth in Nelson v. '
Chicago Mill & Lumber Corp., 76 F.2d 17, (8th Cir.,
1935), wherein 'the court stated:
"The essential elements of estoppel, as
applicable in this case, are: C1) ignorance of
the party claiming estoppel of the matter asserted; (2) silence concerning [the J matter
where there is a duty to speak amounting to
misrepresentation or concealment of a material
fact; ( 3) action by the party relying on the
misrepresentation or concealment; and (4)
damages resulting if the estoppel is denied."
iv

!

The court in the Nelson case held that the Plaintiffs
by their silence did not conceal any material fact and
the Defendants were not damaged by the omission.
Such is not the case under the circumstances of the
present case. The difference between the amounts
which could be claimed as profits and royalties by
the Plaintiffs if the Lease Agreement were to be
interpreted as they now contend and the sums paid
to and accepted by them in full satisfaction of their
royalties under the earlier construction, would be
astronomical. Moreover, the costs of transportation
would telescope to where the product could not be
mined or sold at a profit.
In Murray Hill Mining & Mill Co. v. Havenor,
24 Utah 73, 66 P. 762 ( 1901), the Utah Supreme Court
was confronted with the determination of title and
possession of mining interests. The Defendants
claimed they had never assigned such (C 384) rights
to the Plaintiff corporation and the Defendants pled
the Statute of Frauds in that the only document
which indicated the holding of the mining claims
by the corporation was the Articles of Incorporation.
The court held that whether or not there was the
necessary writing there was estoppel in pais, i.e., the
Defendants were estopped by their prior conduct from
asserting their claim. Explaining this concept, the
court states:
"The vital principle of estoppel in pais
is that he who, in his dealings and contacts
speaks falsely, or is silent when conscience
makes it his duty to reveal the truth, shall
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not be permitted to speak the truth when conscience requires him to be silent; that he who
by his language or conduct, leads another
believe that certain facts exist, and the other
is induced thereby to make expenditures, incur
liabilities, or to do what he otherwise would
not have done, shall not, to the injury of the
other, be permitted to dispute those facts, or by
the enforcement of an adverse claim, based
upon different facts, disappoint the expectations which his language or conducts inspired.
No one is permitted by his language, silence,
or conduct to mislead another to his injury."
(Emphasis added)
The plaintiffs in the present case cannot expressly consent in writing to two assignments to
assignees who have plants throughout the United
States, and make no demands upon them to take the
ore requirements of these plants from the leased
premises at Sigurd, and later contend, after the last
assignee has taken the assignment in reliance on
past interpretation of the Lease Agreement, that it
must now supply all of its requirements from the
leased premises, thus eliminating all profit from the
plants so supplied.
It follows from their conduct that the Plaintiffs
are estopped from asserting their current interpretation of the "requirements" clause of the Lease Agreement. ( C 385)
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